David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Social Philosophy and Policy 8 (2):150 (1991)
In analyzing the development of the concept of civil rights since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, two historical accounts seem available. According to the first account, the concept initially encompassed a relatively limited set of rights, associated with the ability of all citizens to engage in the productive activities of the economy and avail themselves of the protection of the legal system. Then the concept gradually expanded to include what had initially been thought of as political rights, such as the right to vote, and then to identify the entire set of rights to equal treatment in all domains of life outside a relatively narrowly-defined private sphere. According to the second account, the concept of civil rights was fuzzy from the outset; although political actors spoke as if they had a clear understanding of distinctions among civil, political, and social rights, close examination of their language shows that the distinctions tended to collapse under slight pressure
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Adam Fairclough (2004). Thurgood Marshall's Pursuit of Equality Through Law. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 7 (4):177-199.
Richard A. Jones (2004). Affirmative Inaction? The Aftermath of Grutter and Gratz. Radical Philosophy Review 7 (2):179-193.
Brian E. Butler (2001). All Rights Are Affirmative. Radical Philosophy Review 4 (1):95-101.
Louis P. Pojman (1998). The Case Against Affirmative Action. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (1):97-115.
Kwame Anthony Appiah (2011). “Group Rights” and Racial Affirmative Action. Journal of Ethics 15 (3):265-280.
Engelbert Ssekasozi (1999). A Philosophical Defense of Affirmative Action. Edwin Mellen Press.
Prue Burns & Jan Schapper (2008). The Ethical Case for Affirmative Action. Journal of Business Ethics 83 (3):369 - 379.
Anita L. Allen (2011). Was I Entitled or Should I Apologize? Affirmative Action Going Forward. Journal of Ethics 15 (3):253-263.
J. Robert, S. Prichard & Alan Brudner (1983). Tort Liability for Breach of Statute: A Natural Rights Perspective. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 2 (1):89-117.
J. Robert S. Prichard & Alan Brudner (1983). Tort Liability for Breach of Statute: A Natural Rights Perspective. Law and Philosophy 2 (1):89 - 117.
Leo Groarke (1990). Affirmative Action as a Form of Restitution. Journal of Business Ethics 9 (3):207 - 213.
Bill E. Lawson (2011). Sterba on Affirmative Action, or, It Never Was the Bus, It Was Us! Journal of Ethics 15 (3):281-290.
Paula Chegwidden & Wendy R. Katz (1983). American and Canadian Perspectives on Affirmative Action: A Response to the Fraser Institute. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 2 (3):191 - 202.
Brian E. Butler (2001). All Rights Are Affirmative. Radical Philosophy Review 4 (1/2):95-101.
Added to index2010-08-31
Total downloads10 ( #366,033 of 1,939,032 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #458,475 of 1,939,032 )
How can I increase my downloads?