Die atomistik bei Ludwig Boltzmann. Zur wissenschaftlichen und philosophischen bedeutung einer kontroversen position am ende Des 19. jahrhunderts

The atomic hypothesis according to Ludwig Boltzmann. The scientific and philosophical importance of a controversial position at the close of the 19th century. This paper examines Boltzmann’s standpoint in the controversy over the existence of atoms between himself on the one hand and Mach, Ostwald, Helm and to some extent Duhem on the other hand. The latter wanted to develop a physics only constructed with perceptible phenomena. Because of the lack of empirical evidence of the atoms at that time they did not accept them for the construction of physics. In contrast, Boltzmann found the acceptance of atoms to be a fruitful assumption, since for him the construction of physics required going beyond perceptible phenomena. Two different conceptions of nature and of the ways to know nature clashed in this disagreement between Boltzmann and his opponents. Op-posing one-sided positions, Boltzmann supported the hypothetical character of science, in which more than one basic hypothesis can be advanced: he was open to the possibility of fundamental revolutions in science.
Keywords atom  Boltzmann  continuity and discontinuity of nature  description  energe-tics  Helm  Herz  hypothesis  Mach  Ostwald  phenomenology  picture
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DOI 10.2307/25171292
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S. G. Brush (1982). The Kind of Motion We Call Heat. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (2):165-186.

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