Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168 (2006)
|Abstract||At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that must be explained by means of specifi c examples and associated comments.|
|Keywords||Absence Belief Body Consciousness Metaphysics Mind Qualia Block, Ned Shoemaker, Sydney|
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