Absent qualia and the mind-body problem

Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168 (2006)
Abstract
At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that must be explained by means of specifi c examples and associated comments.
Keywords Absence  Belief  Body  Consciousness  Metaphysics  Mind  Qualia  Block, Ned  Shoemaker, Sydney
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Robert Kirk (2008). The Inconceivability of Zombies. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):73 - 89.
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