A theory of phenomenal concepts

In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 91-105 (2003)
Abstract
1) There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts (Loar 1990, Lycan 1996, Papineau 1993, Sturgeon 1994, Tye 1995, 2000, Perry 2001) . There is, alas, no agreement on the nature of phenomenal concepts.
Keywords Concept  Phenomenalism  Physicalism
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    Katalin Balog (2012). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
    William E. S. McNeill (2012). On Seeing That Someone is Angry. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):575-597.
    Pär Sundström (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.

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