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- Michael Tye (2009). Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Mit Press.Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism.Reading list | Discuss | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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The book under review is a collection of thirteen essays on the nature phenomenal concepts and the ways in which phenomenal concepts figure in debates over physicalism. Phenomenal concepts are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences (aka “qualia”) whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. There are recent arguments, originating in Descartes’ famous conceivability argument, that purport to show that phenomenal experience is irreducibly non-physical. Second, phenomenal concepts are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. Both the anti-physicalist arguments and physicalist replies to these arguments turn on views about the nature of phenomenal concepts. In this review I survey the many ways in which the essays in this volume are engaged (pro or con) with anti-physicalist arguments and the role phenomenal concepts play in these arguments.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... In this paper, we present an account of phenomenal con- sciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is experience, and the _problem _of phenomenal consciousness is to explain how physical processes.
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| | Other links: books.google.com springerlink.com | Scholar | At my library | More options ... 1 Introduction 2 Perceptual Concepts 2.1 Perceptual Concepts are not Demonstrative 2.2 Perceptual Concepts as Stored Templates 2.3 Perceptual Semantics 2.4 Perceptually Derived Concepts 3 Phenomenal Concepts.
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| Discuss | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: kcl.ac.uk hdl.handle.net | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
| | Other links: kcl.ac.uk hdl.handle.net | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Michael Tye has recently argued that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences is "one and the same as" (1) Poised (2) Abstract (3) Non-conceptual (4) Intentional Content (PANIC). Tye argues extensively that PANIC Theory accounts for differences in phenomenal character in representational terms. But another task of a theory of phenomenal consciousness is to account for the difference between those mental states that have phenomenal character at all and those that do not. By going through each of the four qualifiers of PANIC, we argue that PANIC Theory fails to account for this difference in genuinely representational terms. We suggest, furthermore, that the reasons it fails are likely to be endemic to all representational theories of phenomenal consciousness.
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| Discuss | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: informaworld.com taylorandfrancis.metapress.com ingentaconnect.com tandfonline.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
| | Other links: informaworld.com taylorandfrancis.metapress.com ingentaconnect.com tandfonline.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... David Papineau’s Thinking About Consciousness tells a skillful, inventive, and plausible story about why, given that the phenomenal character of conscious experience is an unproblematically physical property, we continue to suffer from “intuitions of dualism”. According to Papineau, we are misled by the peculiar structure of the phenomenal concepts we use to introspect upon that phenomenal character. Roughly: unlike physical concepts, phenomenal concepts exemplify the kind of experience they are concepts of; and this creates the mistaken impression that the physical concepts leave something out. I find much of Papineau’s account congenial, though I have some questions about his characterization of phenomenal concepts. I will take up two of these questions here. On Papineau’s view, phenomenal concepts are mental terms that are formed by concatenating an experience operator, namely ‘the experience: —’, together with “an actual state of… perceptual classification” (115). The latter state, itself an experience, fills the blank in the experience operator; and the concept thus formed refers to the type of experience whose instances are relevantly similar to that perceptual filling.1 Papineau writes.
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| Discuss | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: ingentaconnect.com philosophy.utoronto.ca dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
| | Other links: ingentaconnect.com philosophy.utoronto.ca dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... The nature of phenomenal consciousness is a “hard problem” of several scientific branches. According to materialism, consciousness is a part of a physical world. According to other theories, consciousness does contain unphysical degrees of freedom. Many authors believe that it is impossible to prove or to disprove these viewpoints. We prove that materialism is a verifiable concept and propose methods to perform the verification. One should study the physical mechanism of phenomenal judgments (human words and writings about consciousness). We analyze four possible mechanisms of the generation of phenomenal judgments. This approach can be used for a scientific choice between different theories. As an example, we provide a non-functionalist method to check the sentience of the systems with artificial intelligence.
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| | Scholar | More options ... The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts.
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| Discuss | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: mind.oxfordjournals.org jstor.org ingentaconnect.com mind.oupjournals.org dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
| | Other links: mind.oxfordjournals.org jstor.org ingentaconnect.com mind.oupjournals.org dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Phenomenal consciousness is the property mental states, events, and processes have
when, and only when, there is something it is like for their subject to undergo
them, or be in them. What it is like to have a conscious experience is customarily
referred to as the experience’s phenomenal character. Theories of consciousness attempt
to account for this phenomenal character. This article surveys the currently
prominent theories, paying special attention to the various attempts to explain a
state’s phenomenal character in terms of its representational content.
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| | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. The controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal concepts--knowledge of consciousness and the associated concepts--have come to play increasingly prominent roles in this debate. Consider Frank Jackson's famous case of Mary, the super-scientist who learns all the physical information while confined in a black-and-white room. According to Jackson, if physicalism is true, then Mary's physical knowledge should allow her to deduce what it's like to see in color. Yet it seems intuitively clear that she learns something when she leaves the room. But then how can consciousness be physical? Arguably, whether this sort of reasoning is sound depends on how phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge are construed. For example, some argue that the Mary case reveals something about phenomenal concepts but has no implications for the nature of consciousness itself. Are responses along these lines adequate? Or does the problem arise again at the level of phenomenal concepts? The papers in this volume engage with the latest developments in this debate. The authors' perspectives range widely. For example, Daniel Dennett argues that anti-physicalist arguments such as the knowledge argument are simply confused; David Papineau grants that such arguments at least reveal important features of phenomenal concepts; and David Chalmers defends the anti-physicalist arguments, arguing that the "phenomenal concept strategy" cannot succeed.
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| | Other links: oup.co.uk ingentaconnect.com | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Siewert identifies a special kind of conscious experience, phenomenal consciousness, that is the sort of consciousness missing in a variety of cases of blindsight. He then argues that phenomenal consciousness has been neglected by students of consciousness when it should not be. According to Siewert, the neglect is based at least in part on two false assumptions: (i) phenomenal features are not intentional and (ii) phenomenal character is restricted to sensory experience. By identifying an essential tension in Siewert's characterization of phenomenal consciousness, I argue that his case for denying (i) and (ii) is at best incomplete.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Discussion of Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts
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