Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion

Mind 108 (432):705-25 (1999)
Abstract
The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts
Keywords Cognition  Consciousness  Metaphysics  Phenomenalism
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Tomas Bogardus (2013). Undefeated Dualism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.

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