David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1997)
Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mindbody problem
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Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery (2010). Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.
Pär Sundström (2007). Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.
Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman (2011). Towards a Computational Theory of Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827.
Dimitris Platchias (2009). Representationalism, Symmetrical Supervenience and Identity. Philosophia 37 (1):31-46.
Richard J. Hall (2007). Phenomenal Properties as Dummy Properties. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):199 - 223.
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