The admissible contents of visual experience

Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562 (2009)
Abstract
My purpose is to take a close look at the nature of visual content. I discuss the view that visual experiences have only existential contents, the view that visual experiences have either singular or gappy contents, and the view that visual experiences have multiple contents. I also consider a proposal about visual content inspired by Kaplan's well known theory of indexicals. I draw out some consequences of my discussion for the thesis of intentionalism with respect to the phenomenal character of visual experience.
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References found in this work BETA
Martin Davies (1992). Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45.
H. P. Grice (1961). The Causal Theory of Perception, Part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121:121-152.
David Lewis (1980). Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (September):239-249.
C. B. Martin (1994). Dispositions and Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.

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