The Metaphysics of Mind

Cambridge University Press (1989)
Abstract
In this provocative book, Michael Tye presents his unique account of the metaphysical foundations of psychological discourse. In place of token identity theory or eliminative materialism, he advocates a generalisation of the adverbial approach to sensory experience, the 'operator theory'. He applies this to the analysis of prepositional attitudes, arguing that mental statements cannot involve reference to mental events or objects and that therefore causal statements about the mental cannot be regarded as asserting relations between events. This adverbial theory has the virtue of being both simple and systematic and is an important contribution to the philosophy of mind
Keywords Functionalism  Language  Mental Event  Mental Object  Metaphysics  Mind  Operator  Psychology  Sensation
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Call number BF161.T94 1989
ISBN(s) 9780521354707   0521115264     9780521115261
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Arvid Båve (2009). Why is a Truth-Predicate Like a Pronoun? Philosophical Studies 145 (2):297 - 310.
Marc Alspector-Kelly (2006). Pretending to See. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):713-728.

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