David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Cambridge University Press (1989)
In this provocative book, Michael Tye presents his unique account of the metaphysical foundations of psychological discourse. In place of token identity theory or eliminative materialism, he advocates a generalisation of the adverbial approach to sensory experience, the 'operator theory'. He applies this to the analysis of prepositional attitudes, arguing that mental statements cannot involve reference to mental events or objects and that therefore causal statements about the mental cannot be regarded as asserting relations between events. This adverbial theory has the virtue of being both simple and systematic and is an important contribution to the philosophy of mind
|Keywords||Functionalism Language Mental Event Mental Object Metaphysics Mind Operator Psychology Sensation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$29.69 new (26% off) $29.91 used (26% off) $35.27 direct from Amazon (12% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BF161.T94 1989|
|ISBN(s)||9780521354707 0521115264 9780521115261|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2007). The Ontology of Concepts: Abstract Objects or Mental Representations? Noûs 41 (4):561-593.
Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
Arvid Båve (2010). Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer. Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
Simone Gozzano (2013). Reconsidering the Logic of Emotion. Philosophia 41 (3):787-794.
Arvid Båve (2009). Why is a Truth-Predicate Like a Pronoun? Philosophical Studies 145 (2):297 - 310.
Similar books and articles
Thomas Kroedel (2008). Mental Causation as Multiple Causation. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):125-143.
John Weckert (1990). Functionalism's Impotence. Philosophical Inquiry 32 (1-2):32-43.
Richard E. Aquila (1979). Mental Particulars, Mental Events, and the Bundle Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (March):109-120.
Kathleen V. Wilkes (1981). Functionalism, Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):147-67.
Mark McCullagh (2000). Functionalism and Self-Consciousness. Mind and Language 15 (5):481-499.
Tyler Burge (1993). Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
Peter T. Geach (1957). Mental Acts: Their Content And Their Objects. Humanities Press.
J. N. Wright (1944). Mental Activity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 44:107-126.
L. J. Eshelman (1977). Functionalism, Sensations, and Materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (June):255-74.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #132,759 of 1,907,694 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #273,183 of 1,907,694 )
How can I increase my downloads?