David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):65-80 (2007)
I argue in the paper that the problem of freedom has been misconstrued. There is no one problem of freedom but many problems concerning individual agents’ responsiveness to principles and reasons. The problem of free will results from attempts to incorporate the notion of freedom, which belongs to the order of guiding action, into a determinist framework of explanation. My view could be seen as compatibilist because it denies the existence of a fundamental conflict between freedom and determinism. However, since libertarian accounts of local indeterminism are pointless on my view, it cannot be easily place with the compatibilism/libertarianism distinction. Instead of entering the hopelessly unproductive metaphysical debates about freedom and determinism, I propose to turn attention to the domain of ethics. Problems of freedom are questions about the deliberative processes that terminate in action and about reasons and principles on which they are based. To say that an action is free is not to claim that it is independent from causal determination; rather, it is to say that it has been decided upon
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Mary T. Clark (ed.) (1973). The Problem of Freedom. New York,Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Vere Chappell (1994). Locke on the Freedom of the Will. In G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context. Oxford University Press 101--21.
Hans Ruin (2008). The Destiny of Freedom: In Heidegger. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (3):277-299.
Simon Shengjian Xie (2009). What is Kant: A Compatibilist or an Incompatibilist? A New Interpretation of Kant's Solution to the Free Will Problem. Kant-Studien 100 (1):53-76.
Raymond Van Over (1974). The Psychology of Freedom. Fawcett Publications.
J. David Velleman (1989). Epistemic Freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1):73-97.
Nicholas Rescher (2008). Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal. Transaction Publishers.
Timothy O’Connor (2005). Freedom with a Human Face. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.
Joseph K. Campbell (ed.) (2004). Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Zahoor-UL- Hassan, The Ideal of Free Will and Determination in Anglo American Philosophy During 1969-80, with Special Reference to Stuart Hampshire, Anthony Kenny, P.F Strawson, and Donald Davidson. [REVIEW]
By Alan Carter (2003). Morality and Freedom. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):161–180.
Susanne Bobzien (1997). Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and Their Relation to Ethics. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 41 (S68):71-89.
John R. Searle (2001). Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology. Philosophy 76 (298):491-514.
Hans Jürgen Eysenck (1982). The Paradox of 'Freedom' and the Social Function of Psychiatry. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 3 (3):367-374.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads19 ( #203,447 of 1,911,671 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #144,539 of 1,911,671 )
How can I increase my downloads?