David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 36 (3):271-279 (1969)
This paper draws its title from the recent symposium of which it was part; it attempts to respond to the question raised by that title, taking current work in set theory into account. To this end the paper contrasts set theory with number theory, examines a severe brand of set-theoretic realism that is suggested by a passage from Godel, and sketches a first-order way of looking at the results about competing extensions of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. A formalistic sentiment may be detectable in some portions of the paper
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michael D. Potter (2004). Set Theory and its Philosophy: A Critical Introduction. Oxford University Press.
Gregory H. Moore (1978). The Origins of Zermelo's Axiomatization of Set Theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):307 - 329.
Michael Rathjen (1992). A Proof-Theoretic Characterization of the Primitive Recursive Set Functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (3):954-969.
A. Weir (1998). Naïve Set Theory is Innocent! Mind 107 (428):763-798.
Paul Strauss (1991). Arithmetical Set Theory. Studia Logica 50 (2):343 - 350.
Gregory H. Moore (1980). Beyond First-Order Logic: The Historical Interplay Between Mathematical Logic and Axiomatic Set Theory. History and Philosophy of Logic 1 (1-2):95-137.
Michael Rathjen (2005). The Disjunction and Related Properties for Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory. Journal of Symbolic Logic 70 (4):1233 - 1254.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads21 ( #196,341 of 1,938,769 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #458,338 of 1,938,769 )
How can I increase my downloads?