David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1975)
In these challenging pages, Unger argues for the extreme skeptical view that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have any reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot ever have any emotions about anything: no one can ever be happy or sad about anything. Finally, in this reduction to absurdity of virtually all our supposed thought, he argues that no one can ever believe, or even say, that anything is the case.
|Keywords||Ignorance (Theory of knowledge Skepticism|
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|Call number||BD221.U53 2002|
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Citations of this work BETA
Clayton Littlejohn (2010). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Evidence and Armchair Access. Synthese 179 (3):479 - 500.
Steven L. Reynolds (2013). Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.
Glen Hoffmann (2011). Two Kinds of A Priori Infallibility. Synthese 181 (2):241-253.
Dylan Dodd (2011). Against Fallibilism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.
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