Philosophical Relativity

Oxford University Press (1984)
In this short but meaty book, Peter Unger questions the objective answers that have been given to central problems in philosophy. As Unger hypothesizes, many of these problems are unanswerable, including the problems of knowledge and scepticism, the problems of free will, and problems of causation and explanation. In each case, he argues, we arrive at one answer only relative to an assumption about the meaning of key terms, terms like "know" and like "cause," even while we arrive at an opposite answer relative to quite different assumptions, but equally arbitrary assumptions, about what the key terms mean.
Keywords Relativity
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Call number BD221.U535 2002
ISBN(s) 019515553X   9780195155532  
DOI 10.2307/2219350
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Janet Levin (2008). Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.
Peter Ludlow (2008). Cheap Contextualism. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):104-129.

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