David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517-536 (2007)
We often form beliefs about our own mental states. I believe that I have political beliefs of a certain kind. Perhaps you believe that you want to eat fish for lunch. Most of us have believed, at some moment or other, that we were in love. Let us call beliefs of this kind ‘self-ascriptions’ of mental states. Self- ascriptions normally enjoy a special kind of epistemic justification when the self-ascribed mental state is of a certain type, such as a belief or a desire. Our justification for self-ascriptions of those mental stases seems to be, in some way, privileged or authoritative. In the philosophical literature, this idea is often expressed by saying that we have privileged access to our own mental states, or that our self-ascriptions constitute self-knowledge. The goal of this discussion will be to account for that fact. I will concentrate on privileged access to our own desires.[ii].
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References found in this work BETA
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
Richard A. Moran (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Alex Byrne (2011). Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
Jordi Fernández (2010). Thought Insertion and Self-Knowledge. Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.
Lauren Ashwell (2013). Deep, Dark…or Transparent? Knowing Our Desires. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):245-256.
David Wall (2012). A Moorean Paradox of Desire. Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84.
Alex Byrne (2011). I—Alex Byrne: Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
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