How Action Governs Intention

Philosophers' Imprint 8 (5):1-19 (2008)
Why can't deliberation conclude in an intention except by considering whether to perform the intended action? I argue that the answer to this question entails that reasons for intention are determined by reasons for action. Understanding this feature of practical deliberation thus allows us to solve the toxin puzzle
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,904
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Niko Kolodny (2008). The Myth of Practical Consistency. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.
Conor Mchugh (2014). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
Sarah K. Paul (2012). How We Know What We Intend. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.
James Morauta (2010). In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.
Jonathan Way (2012). Explaining the Instrumental Principle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):487-506.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

36 ( #89,956 of 1,725,466 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #110,437 of 1,725,466 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.