Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):337-352 (1999)
|Abstract||Expressivists, such as Blackburn, analyse sentences such as 'S thinks that it ought to be the case that p' as S hoorays that p'. A problem is that the former sentence can be negated in three different ways, but the latter in only two. The distinction between refusing to accept a moral judgement and accepting its negation therefore cannot be accounted for. This is shown to undermine Blackburn's solution to the Frege-Geach problem.|
|Keywords||expressivism Simon Blackburn Frege-Geach problem negation|
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