David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):99-122 (2004)
Suppose we are prepared to conceive the meaning of a sentence as a classification criterion which enables us to establish whether something is or is not a justification to believe that sentence. Which properties of the intuitive notion of justification are, from this point of view, essential for believing a sentence? And how might a theoretical notion of justification for a sentence be defined? In Sections 2-5 some properties are suggested as essential, in particular Intentionality (a justification is always a justification for a sentence), Defeasibility (a justification for a sentence A can cease to be a justification for A as new information is received), and Epistemic transparency (a justification for A is not a justification for A unless it is recognized as such by an idealized knowing subject). In Section 6 a sketch of definition is proposed, according to which a justification for a sentence A is a cognitive state in which the subject has at his disposal a certain amount of information, and the hypothesis that A is the best explanation of that information. Section 7 shows how the notion defined escapes a crucial objection to defeasible justifications recently stated by P. Casalegno
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Gabriele Usberti (2006). Towards a Semantics Based on the Notion of Justification. Synthese 148 (3):675 - 699.
Robert Audi (1991). Structural Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:473-492.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Christopher Menzel (1990). The Basic Notion of Justification. Philosophical Studies 59 (3):235-261.
Gregor Betz (2012). On Degrees of Justification. Erkenntnis 77 (2):237-272.
Nicla Vassallo & Claudia Bianchi (2010). Naturalizing Meaning Through Epistemology: Some Critical Notes. In M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. 311--321.
Declan Smithies (2012). Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
Jane Duran (1994). Justification À la Mode and Justification Simpliciter. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (2):178-191.
Ram Neta (2007). Propositional Justification, Evidence, and the Cost of Error. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):197–216.
Jeffrey Glick (2010). Justification and the Right to Believe. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):532-544.
Linda Radzik (2000). Justification and the Authority of Norms. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4):451-461.
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010). Is There a Viable Account of Well-Founded Belief? Erkenntnis 72 (2):205 - 231.
Paul Silva Jr (2013). How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
Added to index2011-12-01
Total downloads4 ( #289,796 of 1,410,541 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #179,143 of 1,410,541 )
How can I increase my downloads?