Abstract
Economists often seem to hold the belief that it is in the nature of a model that it cannot but be false. Once this view is adopted, any further truth talk in connection to models becomes obsolete or irrelevant. I want to resist this conclusion. I grant that a model may appear to be false in the sense that the world does not seem to be the way it is being represented in the model. In earlier work, I have entertained the idea that what appears to be false may be true after all, and I have shown some situations in which there is an obvious way of travelling from one to the other, from the appearances of falsehood to possible truth. I suggest to distinguish between two strategies of bridging this apparent gap. One is based on revising one's idea of the relevant truth bearers while sticking to some non-epistemic correspondence of truth. The other is based on revising one's conception of truth by substituting the non-epistemic conception for some epistemic conception of truth that defines truth in terms of our ways of recognizing it.