Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):533-544 (2005)
|Abstract||It has become a standard view in the philosophy of science scholarship (e.g., van Fraassen ) that debates on the problem of laws of nature and/or scientific laws employ pre-Kantian approaches to the subject in question. But what exactly a Kantian approach might look like and, above all, what Kant endorses on this matter are not entirely settled issues. In particular, this regards Kant’s argument on the problem of ’necessity grounding’ with respect to different types of the so-called “empirical laws of nature” (empirische Naturgesetze) in the third Critique. In order to assess the aforementioned problem, in this paper I will address the following questions:1) What is Kant’s main nomological criterion or a combination of criteria, that is, the criterion/criteria according to which we can explicate the distinction between laws of nature and accidentally true statements?2) What exactly is the role of an apriori law of nature, such as the one instantiated by the Second Analogy of Experience, in considering nature as a lawful existence of objects?3) On what grounds can a statement describing a particular causal regularity, for example, the statement “the sun warms the stone” (Prolegomena, N 301), be viewed as an empirical law of nature?4) Is Kant’s systematicity a nomological criterion in the strict and standard sense or, rather, is it a certain kind of transcendental criterion, which not only makes the whole of Kant’s nomological machinery up and running, but also has decisive influence on the final arrangement of nomological criteria?|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Markus Schrenk (2005). The Bookkeeper and the Lumberjack. Metaphysical Vs. Nomological Necessity. In G. Abel (ed.), Kreativität. XX. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie. Sektionsbeiträge Band 1. Universitätsverlag der Technischen Universität.
Markus Schrenk (2011). Interfering with Nomological Necessity. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):577-597.
Brian Skyrms (1966). Nomological Necessity and the Paradoxes of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 33 (3):230-249.
Nancy Cartwright (1997). Models: The Blueprints for Laws. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):303.
Timothy Rosenkoetter (2009). Truth Criteria and the Very Project of a Transcendental Logic. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 91 (2):193-236.
Stephen Mumford (2005). Laws and Lawlessness. Synthese 144 (3):397?413.
Mario Bunge (1961). Kinds and Criteria of Scientific Laws. Philosophy of Science 28 (3):260-281.
Alexander Bird (2002). Laws and Criteria. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):511-42.
Max Kistler (2005). Necessary Laws. In Jan Faye, Paul Needham, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Nature’s Principles. Springer.
John Foster (2004). The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the Existence of God. Oxford University Press.
Garrett Pendergraft (2010). The Explanatory Power of Local Miracle Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):249-266.
Robert C. Cummins (2000). "How Does It Work" Versus "What Are the Laws?": Two Conceptions of Psychological Explanation. In F. Keil & Robert A. Wilson (eds.), Explanation and Cognition, 117-145. MIT Press.
D. H. Mellor (1990). Laws, Chances and Properties. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):159 – 170.
Andrzej Stępnik (2007). Prawa natury, prawa nauki a cuda. Krytyka argumentów Hume'a przeciwko cudom. Filozofia Nauki 4.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads13 ( #95,541 of 722,863 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #9,707 of 722,863 )
How can I increase my downloads?