David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 4 (2):363-379 (2009)
The correspondence between Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins of 1706–8, while not well known, is a spectacularly good debate between a dualist and a materialist over the possibility of giving a materialist account of consciousness and personal identity. This article puts the Clarke Collins Correspondence in a broader context in which it can be better appreciated, noting that it is really a debate between John Locke and Anthony Collins on one hand, and Samuel Clarke and Joseph Butler on the other. Anthony Collins argues on behalf of John Locke's claim that it would be as easy for God to superadd the power of thinking to matter as for him to connect a soul to a body. Locke did not believe that matter could naturally produce thought or consciousness, but it was in God's power to make matter think. To defend Locke's claim Collins must defend the claim that there are emergent properties in the world – properties of a whole that are not possessed by the parts. Collins also defends a materialist version of Locke's account of personal identity against a variety of charges. Because the topics of debate in the correspondence are of such great interest to us, it deserves to be rescued from the neglect into which it fell and from which intellectual historians and philosophers have only recently and partially removed it.
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References found in this work BETA
Robin Attfield (1977). Clarke, Collins and Compounds. Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (1):45-54.
Roderick M. Chisholm (1969). The Loose and Popular and the Strict and Philosophical Senses of Identity. In Norman S. Care & Robert H. Grimm (eds.), Perception and Personal Identity. Cleveland, Press of Case Western Reserve University. 82--106.
Howard M. Ducharme (1986). Personal Identity in Samuel Clarke. Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (3):359-383.
Thomas Anand Holden (2004). The Architecture of Matter: Galileo to Kant. Oxford University Press.
Margaret Candee Jacob (1969). John Toland and the Newtonian Ideology. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 32:307-331.
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