Cognitive neuroscience versus epistemologically different worlds

University of Bucharest Press (2012)
From the “epistemologically different worlds” perspective, I analyze the status of cognitive neuroscience today. I investigate the main actual topics in cognitive neuroscience: localization and the brain imaging, the binding problem (Treisman’s feature integration theory and synchronized oscillations approach), differentiation and integration, optimism versus skepticism approaches, perception and object recognition, space and the mind, crossmodal interactions, and the holistic view against localization. I want to show that these problems are pseudo-problems and this “science” has “No ontology landscape”.
Keywords cognitive neuroscience  localization  binding problem
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
Download options
PhilPapers Archive
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Gabriel Vacariu (2011). The Mind-Body Problem Today. Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):26-34.
    Dorothée Legrand & Franck Grammont (2005). A Matter of Facts. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):249-257.

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    329 ( #568 of 1,088,810 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    107 ( #216 of 1,088,810 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.