Cognitive neuroscience versus epistemologically different worlds

University of Bucharest Press (2012)
From the “epistemologically different worlds” perspective, I analyze the status of cognitive neuroscience today. I investigate the main actual topics in cognitive neuroscience: localization and the brain imaging, the binding problem (Treisman’s feature integration theory and synchronized oscillations approach), differentiation and integration, optimism versus skepticism approaches, perception and object recognition, space and the mind, crossmodal interactions, and the holistic view against localization. I want to show that these problems are pseudo-problems and this “science” has “No ontology landscape”.
Keywords cognitive neuroscience  localization  binding problem
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Gabriel Vacariu (2011). The Mind-Body Problem Today. Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):26-34.
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