David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Bucharest University Press (2008)
A fundamental error has dominated philosophy and science since ancient times, the assumption of the existence of the 'unicorn-world', that is, the existence of one unique world. In order to avoid this error, it is necessary to replace the unicorn-world with epistemologically different worlds (which presuppose that each class of entities forms a single, unique epistemological world within the same spatio-temporal framework). Within this new framework, we analyze the definition of the “I” in neural (physical) terms and psychological terms and the relationships between the “I” and the other EDWs. Moreover, I show that the majority of “mysteries” like entanglement, non-locality and non-spatiality, are due to the erroneous human thinking presupposition of the “world”, uni-verse in which everything (waves, micro and macro particles) has been situated since Ancient times. The replacement of the “world” with epistemologically different worlds (epistemologically constitutive interactions among classes of epistemologically different entities that belong to epistemologically different worlds) seems to be a better alternative for solving, in fact eliminating, the great mysteries of quantum mechanics.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Edward N. Zalta (1987). On the Structural Similarities Between Worlds and Times. Philosophical Studies 51 (2):213-239.
Luciano Floridi (2010). Information, Possible Worlds and the Cooptation of Scepticism. Synthese 175 (1):63 - 88.
Phillip Bricker (2006). Absolute Actuality and the Plurality of Worlds. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):41–76.
Rob Clifton (1996). On What Being a World Takes Away. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):158.
Gabriel Vacariu & Mihai Vacariu (2010). Mind, Life, and Matter in the Hyperverse. University of Bucharest Publishing Company.
Gabriel Vacariu (2005). Mind, Brain, and Epistemologically Different Worlds. Synthese 147 (3):515-548.
Gabriel Vacariu (2011). The Mind-Body Problem Today. Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):26-34.
Gabriel Vacariu (2011). Being and the Hyperverse. Bucharest University Press.
Added to index2009-10-19
Total downloads227 ( #3,037 of 1,689,894 )
Recent downloads (6 months)22 ( #9,717 of 1,689,894 )
How can I increase my downloads?