Epistemologically Different Worlds

Bucharest University Press (2008)
A fundamental error has dominated philosophy and science since ancient times, the assumption of the existence of the 'unicorn-world', that is, the existence of one unique world. In order to avoid this error, it is necessary to replace the unicorn-world with epistemologically different worlds (which presuppose that each class of entities forms a single, unique epistemological world within the same spatio-temporal framework). Within this new framework, we analyze the definition of the “I” in neural (physical) terms and psychological terms and the relationships between the “I” and the other EDWs. Moreover, I show that the majority of “mysteries” like entanglement, non-locality and non-spatiality, are due to the erroneous human thinking presupposition of the “world”, uni-verse in which everything (waves, micro and macro particles) has been situated since Ancient times. The replacement of the “world” with epistemologically different worlds (epistemologically constitutive interactions among classes of epistemologically different entities that belong to epistemologically different worlds) seems to be a better alternative for solving, in fact eliminating, the great mysteries of quantum mechanics.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
Download options
PhilPapers Archive
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    178 ( #2,689 of 1,088,874 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    23 ( #4,597 of 1,088,874 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.