Mind, brain, and epistemologically different worlds

Synthese 147 (3):515-548 (2005)
The reason why, since Descartes, nobody has found a solution to the mind–body problem seems to be that the problem itself is a false or pseudo-problem. The discussion has proceeded within a pre-Cartesian conceptual framework which itself is a source of the difficulty. Dualism and all its alternatives have preserved the same pre-Cartesian conceptual framework even while denying Descartes’ dualism. In order to avoid this pseudo-problem, I introduce a new perspective with three elements: the subject, the observed object, and the conditions of observation (given by the internal and external tools of observation). On this new perspective, because of the conditions of observation, the mind and the brain belong to epistemologically different worlds
Keywords Brain  Dualism  Mind  Neuroscience  Observer  Science
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
David J. Chalmers (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.

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