Critical Discussion: Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition: A Reply to Kelp and Greco [Book Review]

Erkenntnis 78 (4):963-970 (2013)
Abstract
Elsewhere, I have challenged virtue epistemology and argued that it doesn’t square with mundane cases of extended cognition. Kelp (forthcoming, this journal) and Greco (forthcoming) have responded to my charges, the former by questioning the force of my argument, the latter by developing a new virtue epistemology. Here I consider both responses. I show first that Kelp mischaracterizes my challenge. Subsequently, I identify two new problems for Greco’s new virtue epistemology
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References found in this work BETA
Fred Adams (2012). Extended Cognition Meets Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.

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Shannon Spaulding (2012). Overextended Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):469 - 490.
Christoph Kelp (2009). Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):583-87.
Christoph Kelp (2013). Knowledge: The Safe-Apt View. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):265-278.
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