Giere's (In)Appropriation of Distributed Cognition

Social Epistemology 25 (4):379 - 391 (2011)
Abstract
Ronald Giere embraces the perspective of distributed cognition to think about cognition in the sciences. I argue that his conception of distributed cognition is flawed in that it bears all the marks of its predecessor; namely, individual cognition. I show what a proper (i.e. non-individual) distributed framework looks like, and highlight what it can and cannot do for the philosophy of science
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References found in this work BETA
Ronald Giere (2002). 15 Scientific Cognition as Distributed Cognition. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press. 285.

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Ronald Giere (2002). 15 Scientific Cognition as Distributed Cognition. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press. 285.
Young E. Lee (2008). The Nature of Embodied Distributed Cognition. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 54:21-21.
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