Knowledge without credit, exhibit 4: Extended cognition [Book Review]

Synthese 181 (515):529 (2011)
The Credit Theory of Knowledge (CTK)—as expressed by such figures as John Greco, Wayne Riggs, and Ernest Sosa—holds that knowing that p implies deserving epistemic credit for truly believing that p . Opponents have presented three sorts of counterexamples to CTK: S might know that p without deserving credit in cases of (1) innate knowledge (Lackey, Kvanvig); (2) testimonial knowledge (Lackey); or (3) perceptual knowledge (Pritchard). The arguments of Lackey, Kvanvig and Pritchard, however, are effective only in so far as one is willing to accept a set of controversial background assumptions (for instance, that innate knowledge exists or that doxastic voluntarism is wrong). In this paper I mount a fourth argument against CTK, that doesn’t rest on any such controversial premise, and therefore should convince a much wider audience. In particular, I show that in cases of extended cognition (very broadly conceived), the most salient feature explaining S ’s believing the truth regarding p may well be external to S , that is, it might be a feature of S ’s (non-human, artifactual) environment. If so, the cognitive achievement of knowing that p is not (or only marginally) creditable to S , and hence, CTK is false.
Keywords Knowledge  Credit  Extended cognition
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9744-0
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Spyridon Orestis Palermos (2011). Belief-Forming Processes, Extended. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):741-765.
Fred Adams (2012). Extended Cognition Meets Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.
Richard Menary (2012). Cognitive Practices and Cognitive Character. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):147 - 164.

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