Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314 (2015)
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10.1163/22105700-05011151

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Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.
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Hamid Vahid
Institute for Fundamental Sciences

Citations of this work

Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.
Does Scepticism Presuppose Voluntarism?Jonathan Hill - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):31-50.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.
A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..

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