David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):370-388 (2003)
Recent discussions of externalism about mental content have been dominated by the question whether it undermines the intuitively plausible idea that we have knowledge of the contents of our thoughts. In this article I focus on one main line of reasoning (the so-called 'slow switching argument') for the thesis that externalism and self-knowledge are incompatible. After criticizing a number of influential responses to the argument, I set out to explain why it fails. It will be claimed that the argument trades on an ambiguity, and that only by incorporating certain controversial assumptions does it stand a chance of establishing its conclusion. Finally, drawing on an analogy with Benacerraf's challenge to Platonism, I shall offer some reasons as to why the slow switching argument fails to reveal the real source of tension between externalism and privileged self-knowledge
|Keywords||Argument Epistemology Externalism Platonism Self-knowledge|
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References found in this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
Hartry Field (1989). Realism, Mathematics & Modality. Basil Blackwell.
William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
Colin McGinn (1989). Mental Content. Blackwell.
Tyler Burge (1988). Individualism and Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
Citations of this work BETA
Mahmoud Morvarid (2015). The Epistemological Bases of the Slow Switching Argument. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):17-38.
Mahmoud Morvarid (2014). The Discrimination Argument: A Reply to Dierig. Erkenntnis 79 (5):1209-1219.
Mahmoud Morvarid (2013). Reference Failure, Illusion of Thought and Self‐Knowledge. Dialectica 67 (3):303-323.
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