David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 55 (4):351–362 (2001)
It is generally thought that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck as the post‐Gettier literature makes it abundantly clear. Examples are produced where although a belief is true and justified, it nevertheless falls short of being an instance of knowledge because of the intrusion of luck. Knowledge is regarded as being distinct from lucky guesses. It is, nevertheless, acknowledged by a number of epistemologists that some kind of luck is in fact an inevitable component of the process of knowledge acquisition. In this paper I wish to delineate varieties of epistemic luck in the light of the Gettier literature, and specify the kind that should be tolerated in the process of acquiring knowledge. To do this, it would be best to start by examining some of the recent attempts at analyzing the concept of luck and its bearing on the concept of knowledge
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Edmund Gettier (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Gilbert Harman (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press.
Richard Foley (1987). The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Harvard University Press.
Peter D. Klein (1971). A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
Citations of this work BETA
Peter Baumann (2014). No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):523-551.
Guy Axtell (2007). Two for the Show: Anti-Luck and Virtue Epistemologies in Consonance. Synthese 158 (3):363 - 383.
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