David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 176 (3):447-462 (2010)
Beliefs can be evaluated from a number of perspectives. Epistemic evaluation involves epistemic standards and appropriate epistemic goals. On a truthconducive account of epistemic justification, a justified belief is one that serves the goal of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. Beliefs are also prompted by nonepistemic reasons. This raises the question of whether, say, the pragmatic benefits of a belief are able to rationalize it. In this paper, after criticizing certain responses to this question, I shall argue that, as far as beliefs are concerned, justification has an essentially epistemic character. This conclusion is then qualified by considering the conditions under which pragmatic consequences of a belief can be epistemically relevant
|Keywords||Epistemic reasons Pragmatic reasons Blamelessness Deontological justification Charity|
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References found in this work BETA
Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
Gilbert Harman (1986). Change in View. MIT Press.
William P. Alston (1991). Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Cornell University Press.
William James (1979). The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
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