David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Sabrina Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Clarendon Press (2003)
In recent years, interest in desert-based theories of justice has increased, and this seems to represent a challenge to equality-based theories of justice.[i] The best distribution of outcomeadvantage with respect to desert, after all, need not be the most equal distribution of outcomeadvantage. Some individuals may deserve more than others. Outcome egalitarianism is, however, implausible, and so the conflict of outcome desert with outcome equality is of little significance.[ii] Most contemporary versions of egalitarianism are concerned with neutralizing the differential effects of brute luck and not with equality of outcome. I shall argue that, in order to be plausible, a desert-based theory of justice can and must be compatible with this form of egalitarianism. There is, however, a stronger form of brute luck egalitarianism, which, as I shall explain, is concerned with equalizing the advantages from brute luck—and not merely with neutralizing the differential effects thereof. Under idealized conditions in which agents have perfect information about the outcomes that their choices generate, even this stronger form of egalitarianism, I shall show, is compatible with pure desert theory. Under conditions of incomplete information, however, strong brute luck egalitarianism is incompatible with a pure desert theory that appeals, as I shall explain, to moral, rather than prudential, desert.
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Shlomi Segall (2012). Why Egalitarians Should Not Care About Equality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):507 - 519.
Kerah Gordon-Solmon (2015). Can Comparative Desert Do Without Equality? Philosophical Papers 44 (2):189-205.
Andreas Albertsen & Sören Flinch Midtgaard (2014). Unjust Equalities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):335-346.
David Alm (2010). Desert and the Control Asymmetry. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):361 - 375.
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