Abstract
I shall develop and defend a view of the reparation (e.g., rights to compensation) and enforcement rights (i.e., rights to use force) that individuals have in response to rights-transgressions. The general nature of the account is intermediate to two well-developed alternatives. Pure responsibility accounts hold that reparation and enforcement rights hold only to the extent that the transgressor is culpable, or in some way responsible, for the transgression or resulting harm. Strict liability accounts hold that reparation and enforcement rights hold merely in virtue of the transgression and independently of the agent’s culpability orresponsibility. I shall defend an account according to which: (1) in agreement with pure responsibility accounts, there are reparation rights against a transgressor only to the extent that the transgressor is responsible for transgression-harm (i.e., harm from a transgression), and (2) in agreement with strict liability accounts, there are enforcement rights even against innocent transgressors—although, in agreement with pure responsibility accounts, the extent of the enforcement rights depends in general on the extent to which the transgressor is responsible for the harm and for acting wrongfully. The central feature of the proposed account is that reparation and enforcement rights in a particular context are sensitive to the extent to which their implementation will reduce (in a way specified below) direct transgression-harm.