Graduate studies at Western
Utilitas 6 (02):193- (2009)
|Abstract||Suppose that time is infinitely long towards the future, and that each feasible action produces a finite amount of utility at each time. Then, under appropriate conditions, each action produces an infinite amount of utility. Does this mean that utilitarianism lacks the resources to discriminate among such actions? Since each action produces the same infinite amount of utility, it seems that utilitarianism must judge all actions permissible, judge all actions impermissible, or remain completely silent. If the future is infinite, that is, the prospects for utilitarianism look bleak|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Don Lodzinski (1995). Empty Time and the Eternality of God. Religious Studies 31 (2):187 - 195.
Mark T. Nelson (1991). Utilitarian Eschatology. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (4):339-47.
Fred Feldman (2006). Actual Utility, the Objection From Impracticality, and the Move to Expected Utility. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):49 - 79.
Paul Kabay (2005). An Infinite Temporal Regress is Compatible with the Doctrine of Creatio Originans. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 57 (2):123 - 138.
J. L. A. Garcia & Mark T. Nelson (1994). The Problem of Endless Joy: Is Infinite Utility Too Much for Utilitarianism? Utilitas 6 (02):183-.
P. Bartha (2007). Taking Stock of Infinite Value: Pascal's Wager and Relative Utilities. Synthese 154 (1):5 - 52.
Jeff Jordan (1998). Pascal's Wager Revisited. Religious Studies 34 (4):419-431.
Jean-Paul Vessel (2005). Consequentialist Reactions to Cain's Objection From the Individual. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (2):139-144.
Peter Vallentyne (1995). Infinite Utility: Anonymity and Person-Centredness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):413 – 420.
Peter Vallentyne (1993). Utilitarianism and Infinite Utility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):212 – 217.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #51,703 of 739,350 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,538 of 739,350 )
How can I increase my downloads?