Infinite Utilitarianism: More Is Always Better

Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):307-330 (2004)
We address the question of how finitely additive moral value theories (such as utilitarianism) should rank worlds when there are an infinite number of locations of value (people, times, etc.). In a recent contribution, Hamkins and Montero have argued that Weak Pareto is implausible in the infinite case and defended alternative principles. We here defend Weak Pareto against their criticisms and argue against an isomorphism principle that they defend. Where locations are the same in both worlds but have no natural order, our argument leads to an endorsement, and strengthening, of a principle defended by Vallentyne and Kagan, and to an endorsement of a weakened version of the catching-up criterion developed by Atsumi and by von Weizsäcker
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DOI 10.1017/S0266267104000227
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Peter Vallentyne (1993). Utilitarianism and Infinite Utility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):212 – 217.
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