Moral dilemmas and comparative conceptions of morality

Southern Journal of Philosophy (1):117-124 (1992)
In recent years the problem of moral dilemmas has received the attention of a number of philosophers. Some authors[i] argue that moral dilemmas are not conceptually possible because they are ruled out by certain valid principles of deontic logic. Other authors[ii] insist that moral dilemmas are conceptually possible, and argue that therefore the principles of deontic logic that rule them out must be rejected.
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1992.tb00633.x
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PhilPapers Archive Peter Vallentyne, Moral dilemmas and comparative conceptions of morality
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