David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Research 16:443-445 (1991)
In his paper "Motivational Ties"[i] Al Mele addresses the question of how intentional behavior is possible in "Buridan’s ass" choice situations. This is the question of how an agent could make a choice between two or more (equally) maximally attractive options (such as choosing one, rather than another, of two effectively identical copies of a desired book). For if, as is commonly supposed, choices and intentions are based on the attractiveness of options (roughly, how strongly one is motivated to perform them), then there seems little basis for choosing, or intending, one rather than another of two or more (equally) maximally attractive options.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Alfred R. Mele (1994). Self-Control and Belief. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):419 – 435.
Patrick Derr & Nicholas S. Thompson (1992). Reconstruing Hempelian Motivational Explanations. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):37 - 45.
Joe Mintoff (2001). Buridan's Ass and Reducible Intentions. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:207-221.
Dorit Bar-On & Matthew Chrisman (2009). Ethical Neo-Expressivism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 4. 132-65.
Edmund Chattoe-Brown (2009). The Social Transmission of Choice: A Simulation with Applications to Hegemonic Discourse. Mind and Society 8 (2):193-207.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1986). Skepticism About Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
Alfred R. Mele (1998). Motivational Strength. Noûs 32 (1):23-36.
Chieh-Peng Lin (2006). To Help or Not to Help: Understanding the Helping Intentions From a Mediating Perspective of Social Network Ties. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 63 (2):175 - 182.
Alfred R. Mele (1991). Motivational Ties. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:431-442.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads5 ( #176,011 of 1,006,301 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,735 of 1,006,301 )
How can I increase my downloads?