Abstract

In this essay, we intend to show that Peter Klein and Marshall Swain defeasibility theories do not resolve the Gettier problem. Klein postulates, to any Gettier counterexample, that there is a true proposition which, when associated with evidence-e of S, genuinely defeats the justification of p to S. Swain postulates that, to any Gettier-type counterexample, there is a true proposition which, when associated with the set of reasons-R of S, ultimately defeats the justification of S to believe p. To show that Klein an Swain proposals do not resolve that problem, this essay presents two Gettier-type counterexamples for which there are no genuine defeaters of justification of p by e to S and there are no defeaters not ultimately defeated of the justification of the belief of S that p by R. After doing that, we try to show that the obtained conclusion regarding Klein and Swain defeasibility theories can be extended to any defeasibility theory of knowledge. • DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n2p175.