Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||Regress arguments have convinced many that reasoning cannot require beliefs about what follows from what. In this paper I argue that this is a mistake. Regress arguments rest on dubious (although deeply entrenched) assumptions about the nature of reasoning—most prominently, the assumption that believing p by reasoning is simply a matter of having a belief in p with the right causal ancestry. I propose an alternative account, according to which beliefs about what follows from what play a constitutive role in reasoning.|
|Keywords||Reasoning Regress Self-Knowledge Lewis Carroll Moore's Paradox|
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