Species, sets, and the derivative nature of philosophy

Biology and Philosophy 3 (1):49-66 (1988)
Abstract
Concepts and methods originating in one discipline can distort the structure of another when they are applied to the latter. I exemplify this mostly with reference to systematic biology, especially problems which have arisen in relation to the nature of species. Thus the received views of classes, individuals (which term I suggest be replaced by units to avoid misunderstandings), and sets are all inapplicable, but each can be suitably modified. The concept of fuzzy set was developed to deal with species and I defend its applicability. Taxa at all levels are real and participate in biological processes. Analysis of cause and pattern provides the deep structure in which metabiology is grounded; violation of this principle has led to diverse errors in biology.
Keywords Concept transfer  species  sets
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    References found in this work BETA
    John Beatty (1980). What's Wrong with the Received View of Evolutionary Theory? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:397 - 426.
    Morton Beckner (1968). The Biological Way of Thought. Berkeley, University of California Press.
    Robert N. Brandon (1981). Biological Teleology: Questions and Explanations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 12 (2):91-105.
    Arthur L. Caplan (1979). Darwinism and Deductivist Models of Theory Structure. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 10 (4):341-353.

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