Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):319-324 (2011)
|Abstract||In his essay ‘Transparency, Belief, Intention’, Alex Byrne (2011) argues that transparency—our ability to form beliefs about some of our intentional mental states by considering their subject matter, rather than on the basis of special psychological evidence—involves inferring ‘from world to mind’. In this reply I argue that this cannot be correct. I articulate an intuitive necessary condition for a pattern of belief to count as a rule of inference, and I show that the pattern involved in transparency does not meet that condition. As a result, I conclude that transparency does not involve inference|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Alex Byrne (2011). Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
Quassim Cassam (2011). Knowing What You Believe. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):1-23.
Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Nicholas Silins (forthcoming). Judgment as a Guide to Belief. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford.
Johan Brännmark (2009). Ethical Theories and the Transparency Condition. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):449 - 462.
Matthew Kennedy (2009). Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.
Kieran Setiya (2012). Transparency and Inference. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):263-268.
Clare Batty (2010). Scents and Sensibilia. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):103-118.
Barry G. Stroud (2002). Explaining the Quest and its Prospects: Reply to Boghossian and Byrne. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):239-247.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2006). No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.
Bernard Molyneux (2009). Why Experience Told Me Nothing About Transparency. Noûs 43 (1):116-136.
Matteo Turilli & Luciano Floridi (2009). The Ethics of Information Transparency. Ethics and Information Technology 11 (2):105-112.
Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Added to index2011-08-29
Total downloads68 ( #15,737 of 722,771 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #8,829 of 722,771 )
How can I increase my downloads?