Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 115 (2):171-198 (1998)
|Abstract||Natural properties are those that carve reality at the joints. The notion of carving reality at the joints, however, is somewhat obscure, and is often understood in terms of making for similarity, conferring causal powers, or figuring in the laws of nature. I develop and assess an account of the third sort according to which carving reality at the joints is understood as having the right level of determinacy relative to nomic roles. The account has the attraction of involving very weak metaphysical presuppositions, but fails to capture several features that natural properties are presumed to have.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Fabrice Correia (2008). Ontological Dependence. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1013-1032.
Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.) (2011). Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science. Mit Press.
Peter Vallentyne (1998). The Nomic Role Account of Carving Reality at the Joints. Synthese 115 (2):171-198.
Hanne Andersen (2001). Reference and Resemblance. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S50-.
Bence Nanay (2011). Three Ways of Resisting Essentialism About Natural Kinds. In J. K. Campbell & M. H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 8. MIT Press.
Matthew H. Slater & Andrea Borghini (forthcoming). Introduction: Lessons From the Scientific Butchery. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 8. MIT Press.
Joseph Keim Campbell, Matthew H. Slater & Michael O'Rourke (eds.) (forthcoming). Carving Nature at its Joints. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 8. MIT Press.
Theodore Sider (2011). Writing the Book of the World. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads61 ( #18,785 of 738,054 )
Recent downloads (6 months)39 ( #2,500 of 738,054 )
How can I increase my downloads?