Utilitarianism and infinite utility

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):212 – 217 (1993)
Abstract
Traditional act utilitarianism judges an action permissible just in case it produces as much aggregate utility as any alternative. It is often supposed that utilitarianism faces a serious problem if the future is infinitely long. For in that case, actions may produce an infinite amount of utility. And if that is so for most actions, then utilitarianism, it appears, loses most of its power to discriminate among actions. For, if most actions produce an infinite amount of utility, then few actions produce non-maximal utility, and so most actions are permissible.1 I will argue that potentially infinite futures create no major problems for utilitarianism. Utilitarianism has, I argue, the resources to distinguish among actions all of which produce infinite amounts of utility -- judging some permissible and some impermissible. For brevity of expression I will focus on act utilitarianism, but all the points apply equally well to many other traditional forms of utilitarianism
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DOI 10.1080/00048409312345222
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Luc Lauwers (1997). Infinite Utility: Insisting on Strong Monotonicity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):222 – 233.

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