David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):212 – 217 (1993)
Traditional act utilitarianism judges an action permissible just in case it produces as much aggregate utility as any alternative. It is often supposed that utilitarianism faces a serious problem if the future is infinitely long. For in that case, actions may produce an infinite amount of utility. And if that is so for most actions, then utilitarianism, it appears, loses most of its power to discriminate among actions. For, if most actions produce an infinite amount of utility, then few actions produce non-maximal utility, and so most actions are permissible.1 I will argue that potentially infinite futures create no major problems for utilitarianism. Utilitarianism has, I argue, the resources to distinguish among actions all of which produce infinite amounts of utility -- judging some permissible and some impermissible. For brevity of expression I will focus on act utilitarianism, but all the points apply equally well to many other traditional forms of utilitarianism
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Citations of this work BETA
Paul Bartha (2007). Taking Stock of Infinite Value: Pascal's Wager and Relative Utilities. Synthese 154 (1):5 - 52.
Larry S. Temkin (2015). Rationality with Respect to People, Places, and Times. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):576-608.
Yew-Kwang Ng (1995). Infinite Utility and Van Liedekerke's Impossibility: A Solution. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):408 – 412.
P. Bartha (2007). Taking Stock of Infinite Value: Pascal’s Wager and Relative Utilities. Synthese 154 (1):5-52.
Luc Van Liedekerke (1995). Should Utilitarians Be Cautious Aboutan Infinite Future? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):405 – 407.
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