Acting Autonomously Versus not Acting Heteronomously

Theory and Decision 54 (4):337-355 (2003)
Abstract
This paper presents a formal framework that purports to capture some aspects of Kant's theory of freedom. In particular, we argue that the analysis sheds further light on Kant's distinction between a negative and a positive concept of freedom. The paper shows that the two concepts are not equivalent: we not only argue that in a Kantian perspective negative freedom need not entail positive freedom, but also that there are situations in which a person can be said to be positively but not negatively free (in a Kantian sense)
Keywords autonomy  Kant  negative freedom  positive freedom
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