A regress argument for restrictive incompatibilism

Philosophical Studies 103 (2):201-215 (2001)
Plausibly, no agent ever performs an action without some desire to perform that action. If so, a regress argument shows that, given incompatibilism, we are only rarely free. The argument sidesteps recent objections to this thesis.
Keywords Agent  Desire  Free Will  Incompatibilism  Metaphysics  Motive  Regress  Restrictive  Fischer, J  Ravizza, M  Van Inwagen, P
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DOI 10.1023/A:1010361610463
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