Brute association is not identity

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):171-171 (1999)
Abstract
O'Brien & Opie run into conceptual problems trying to equate stable patterns of neural activation with phenomenal experiences. They also seem to make a logical mistake in thinking that the brute association between stable neural patterns and phenomenal experiences implies that they are identical. In general, the authors do not provide us with a story as to why stable neural patterns constitute phenomenal experience.
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