David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 42 (1):65 - 87 (1995)
Aconvention is a state in which agents coordinate their activity, not as the result of an explicit agreement, but because their expectations are aligned so that each individual believes that all will act so as to achieve coordination for mutual benefit. Since agents are said to follow a convention if they coordinate without explicit agreement, the notion raises fundamental questions: (1) Why do certain conventions remain stable over time?, and (2) How does a convention emerge in the first place? In a pioneering study, Lewis (1969) addresses these questions by applyingnoncooperative game theory. Lewis defines a convention as aNash coordination equilibrium of a noncooperative game that issalient, that is, it is somehow conspicuous to the agents so that all expect one another to conform with the equilibrium. This paper presents a new game theoretic definition of conventions, which formalizes the notion of salience and which also generalizes the class of conventions Lewis discusses in his work. I define a convention as acorrelated equilibrium (Aumann 1974, 1987) satisfying apublic intentions criterion: Every agent wants his intended action to becommon knowledge. I argue that many conventions correspond to correlated equilibria that are not Nash equilibria, and that this is consistent with Lewis' general viewpoint. Finally, I argue that game theoretic characterizations of convention, such as Lewis' and my own, help to explain a convention's stability, but that a fully satisfactory account of the emergence of convention requires a theory of equilibrium selection beyond the scope of Lewis' work.
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Harvard University Press.
Brian Skyrms (1990). The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Harvard University Press.
R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa (1958). Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (1):122-123.
Cristina Bicchieri & Brian Skyrms (1996). Rationality and Coordination. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):627-629.
Thomas Schelling (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Boudewijn de Bruin (2005). Game Theory in Philosophy. Topoi 24 (2):197-208.
Giacomo Sillari (2005). A Logical Framework for Convention. Synthese 147 (2):379 - 400.
Gerald J. Postema (2008). Salience Reasoning. Topoi 27 (1-2):41-55.
Michael Franke (2013). Game Theoretic Pragmatics. Philosophy Compass 8 (3):269-284.
Peter Vanderschraaf (1998). The Informal Game Theory in Hume's Account of Convention. Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):215.
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