Can Reasons be Self-Undermining?

Philosophia 40 (2):411-414 (2012)
Abstract Abstract   The characterization of objective, normative reasons to φ as facts (or truths) that count in favor of φ -ing is widely accepted. But are there any further conditions that considerations which count in favor of φ -ing must meet, in order to count as a reason to φ ? In this brief paper, I consider and reject one such condition, recently proposed by Caspar Hare. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11406-011-9324-7 Authors Rob Van Someren Greve, Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands Journal Philosophia Online ISSN 1574-9274 Print ISSN 0048-3893
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