Can Reasons be Self-Undermining?

Philosophia 40 (2):411-414 (2012)
The characterization of objective, normative reasons to φ as facts (or truths) that count in favor of φ-ing is widely accepted. But are there any further conditions that considerations which count in favor of φ-ing must meet, in order to count as a reason to φ? In this brief paper, I consider and reject one such condition, recently proposed by Caspar Hare.
Keywords Practical reasons  Practical reasoning  Deliberation
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    James Lenman (2000). Consequentialism and Cluelessness. Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (4):342–370.
    Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press.
    Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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