David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):93-97 (2000)
[opening paragraph]: Nicholas Humphrey's ambitiously titled paper falls into two main parts. In the first, he offers a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate and a general prescription for how to go about seeking its solution. In the second, he aims to fill that prescription with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Though I will take issue below with a few important details, I largely agree with his diagnosis of the current debate. However, I remain sceptical about just how far his more specific suggestions can take us toward an adequate understanding of the brain-consciousness relation. Perhaps with more development, they might cut deeper to the core, but in present form they seem subject to the same sorts of objections that Humphrey himself raises against other prior proposals, for example, absent qualia challenges
|Keywords||Metaphysics Mind-body Qualia Sensation Humphrey, N|
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Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Turning Hard Problems on Their Heads. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):75-88.
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