David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavior and Philosophy 30:43 - 59 (2002)
If dispositions are conceived as properties of systems that refer to possible causal relations, dispositions can be used in singular causal explanations. By means of these dispositional explanations, we can explain behavior B of a system x by (i) referring to a situation of type S that triggered B, given that x has a disposition D to do B in S, or (ii) by referring to a disposition D of x to do B in S, given that x is in a situation of type S. Dispositional explanations are adequate and indispensable explanations: they can explain behavior B without explicitly referring to the underlying causal basis in x that constitutes a disposition to do B. Radical Behaviorist explanations are a sort of dispositional explanations, but the dispositional model is not restricted to these explanations. The dispositional model is compatible with, or can be applied to, several research programs.
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Matteo Colombo (2014). Explaining Social Norm Compliance. A Plea for Neural Representations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):217-238.
Jeroen Van Bouwel & Erik Weber (2008). De-Ontologizing the Debate on Social Explanations: A Pragmatic Approach Based on Epistemic Interests. Human Studies 31 (4):423 - 442.
Leen Vreese, Erik Weber & Jeroen Bouwel (2010). Explanatory Pluralism in the Medical Sciences: Theory and Practice. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (5):371-390.
Jeroen Van Bouwel & Erik Weber (2008). De-Ontologizing the Debate on Social Explanations: A Pragmatic Approach Based on Epistemic Interests. [REVIEW] Human Studies 31 (4):423-442.
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