Philosophy of Science 76 (5) (2009)
|Abstract||I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm change as members of a convergent series introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm change on what I take to be Friedman’s own terms.|
|Keywords||Michael Friedman Dynamics of Reason Neo-Kantian philosophy of science|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Thomas M. Besch (2008). Constructing Practical Reason: O'Neill on the Grounds of Kantian Constructivism. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (1).
Nikolas Kompridis (2000). So We Need Something Else for Reason to Mean. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3):271 – 295.
Alison Hills (2008). Kantian Value Realism. Ratio 21 (2):182–200.
Michael Friedman (2001). Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University. Csli Publications.
Alan W. Richardson (2002). Narrating the History of Reason Itself: Friedman, Kuhn, and a Constitutive a Priori for the Twenty-First Century. Perspectives on Science 10 (3):253-274.
Alan Richardson (2010). Ernst Cassirer and Michael Friedman : Kantian or Hegelian Dynamics of Reason? In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court.
Thomas Mormann (2012). A Place for Pragmatism in the Dynamics of Reason? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (1): 27 - 37.
Jonathan Y. Tsou (2003). A Role for Reason in Science. Dialogue 42 (3):573-598.
Michael Friedman (2011). Extending the Dynamics of Reason. Erkenntnis 75 (3):431-444.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads40 ( #28,830 of 549,010 )
Recent downloads (6 months)22 ( #2,377 of 549,010 )
How can I increase my downloads?